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Most works on norms have investigated how norms are regulated using institutional mechanisms.
Very few works have focused on how an agent may infer the norms of a society without the norm
being explicitly given to the agent. This paper describes a mechanism for identifying one type of
norm, an obligation norm. The Obligation Norm Inference (ONI) algorithm described in this paper
makes use of an association rule mining approach to identify obligation norms. Using agent based
simulation of a virtual restaurant we demonstrate how an agent can identify the tipping norm. The
experiments that we have conducted demonstrate that an agent in the system is able to add, remove
and modify norms dynamically. An agent can also ﬂexibly modify the parameters of the system
based on whether it is successful in identifying a norm.
Norms, Social Norms, Obligations, Norm Identiﬁcation, Agent-Based Simulation, Simulation of
Norms, Artiﬁcial Societies, Normative Multi-Agent Systems (NorMAS)
 Introduction
Most works on norms in normative multi-agent systems have concentrated on how norms regulate
behaviour (e.g.L￳pez y L￳pez 2003;Boman 1999;V￡zquez-Salceda 2003). These works assume that
the agent somehow knows (a priori) what the norms of a society are. For example, an agent may
have obtained the norm from a leader (Boman 1999) or through an institution that prescribes what the
norms of the society should be (V￡zquez-Salceda 2003).
Only a few researchers have dealt with how an agent may infer what the norms of a newly joined
society are (Andrighetto et al. 2007, Savarimuthu et al. 2009, 2010). Recognizing the norms of a
society is beneﬁcial to an agent. This process enables the agent to know what the normative
expectation of a society is. As the agent joins and leaves different agent societies, this capability is
essential for the agent to modify its expectations of behaviour, depending upon the society of which it
is a part. As the environment changes, the capability of recognizing a new norm helps an agent to
derive new ways of achieving its intended goals. Such a norm identiﬁcation mechanism can be
useful for software agents that need to adapt to a changing environment. In open agent systems,
instead of possessing predetermined notions of what the norms are, agents can infer and identify
norms through observing patterns of interactions and their consequences. For example, a new agent
joining a virtual environment such as Second Life (Rymaszewski et al. 2006) may have to infer
norms when joining a society as each society may have different norms. It has been noted that
having social norms centrally imposed by the land owners in Second Life is ineffective and there is a
need for the establishment of community driven norms (Stoup, 2008). When a community of agents
determines what the norms should be, the norms can evolve over time. So, a new agent joining the
society should have the ability to recognize the changes to the norms. Identifying norms are also
important because knowing the norms will help the agent not to lose utility as the agent can apply the
norms when situations warrant it. Otherwise, the agent may be sanctioned for not following the
norms.
This work aims to answer the question of how agents infer norms in a multi-agent society. To that
end, the work described in this paper makes use of the norm identiﬁcation architecture ( Savarimuthu
et al. 2010) we have proposed previously. The architecture is based on observation of interactions
between agents and also recognizing signalling actions (sanctions and rewards). We have
demonstrated how an agent can identify prohibition norms. In this work we present how an
autonomous agent is able to identify obligation norms in a society using the Obligation Norm
Inference (ONI) algorithm. When compared to identifying prohibition norms, identifying obligation
norms is difﬁcult because with a prohibition norm it is the occurrence of a particular event (or a
sequence of events) that is the reason for a sanction to occur (e.g. dropping a litter is the reason for
a sanction in a park). In obligation norms, it is the absence of an event that is the cause of a sanction
(e.g. a waiter in a restaurant may sanction a customer for not tipping). It is difﬁcult to detect the
missing event (or a sequence of events) that is responsible for a sanction to occur. The ONI
algorithm presented in this paper can be used to identify obligation norms in a society. Using a
restaurant example, we show how an agent makes use of the norm identiﬁcation framework to
identify an obligation norm - the norm of tipping.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a background on norms and normative multi-
agent systems (NorMAS). Section 3 provides an overview of the norm identiﬁcation framework.
Section 4 describes the Obligation Norm Inference (ONI) algorithm and how the components of the
framework are used in the context of a restaurant scenario. Section 5 describes the experiments that
we have conducted and the results obtained. Section 6 provides a discussion on the work that has
been achieved and the issues that need to be addressed in the future. Concluding remarks are
presented in Section 7.
 Background
In this section, we ﬁrst provide a brief background on the role of norms in human societies. Second,
we discuss the work on norms in the ﬁeld of Normative Multi-agent Systems (NorMAS) and the
relevance of our work in this area.
Norms in human societies
Due to multi-disciplinary interest in norms, several deﬁnitions for norms exist. Ullmann-Margalit
(1977) describes a social norm as a prescribed guide for conduct or action which is generally
complied with by the members of the society. She states that norms are the resultant of complex
patterns of behaviour of a large number of people over a protracted period of time. Elster (1989)
notes the following about social norms. "For norms to be social, they must be shared by other people
and partly sustained by their approval and disapproval. They are sustained by the feelings of









person obeying a norm may also be propelled by positive emotions like anger and indignation …
social norms have a grip on the mind that is due to the strong emotions they can trigger".
Based on the deﬁnitions provided by various researchers, we note that the pragmatic aspects
surrounding a social norm include the following:
Normative expectation of a behavioural regularity: There is a general agreement within the
society that a behaviour is expected on the part of an agent (or actor) by others in a society, in
a given circumstance.
Norm enforcement mechanism: When an agent does not follow a norm, it could be subjected to
a sanction. The sanction could include monetary or physical punishment in the real world
which can trigger emotions (embarrassment, guilt, etc.) or direct loss of utility. Other kind of
sanctions could include agents not being willing to interact with an agent that violated the norm
or the decrease of its reputation score.
Norm spreading mechanism: Having obtained a norm, an agent may spread the norm to other
agents in the society. Examples of norm spreading mechanisms include the notion of advice
from powerful leaders, imitation and learning on the part of an agent.
Many social scientists have studied why norms are adhered to. Some of the reasons for norm
adherence include a) fear of authority or power (Axelrod 1986;Jones and Sergot 1996), b) rational
appeal of the norms (i.e. they promote self interest) (Akerlof 1976;Becker 1978) c) emotions such as
shame, guilt and embarrassment that arise because of non-adherence (Elster 1989;Staller and Petta
2001;Scheve et al. 2006) and d) willingness to follow the crowd (Epstein 2001).
Normative multi-agent systems
The deﬁnition of normative multi-agent systems given by the researchers involved in the NorMAS
2007 workshop is as follows (Boella et al. 2008). A normative multi-agent system is a multi-agent
system organized by means of mechanisms to represent, communicate, distribute, detect, create,
modify and enforce norms, and mechanisms to deliberate about norms and detect norm violation and
fulﬁllment. Researchers in multi-agent systems have studied how the concept of norms can be
applied to artiﬁcial agents. Norms are of interest to multi-agent system (MAS) researchers as they
help in sustaining social order and increase the predictability of behaviour in the society.
Researchers have shown that norms improve cooperation and collaboration (Shoham and
Tennenholtz 1992;Walker and Wooldridge 1995). Epstein has shown that norms reduce the amount
of computation required to make a decision (Epstein 2001). However, software agents may tend to
deviate from norms due to their autonomy. So, the study of norms has become important to MAS
researchers as they can build robust multi-agent systems using the concept of norms and also
experiment on how norms may evolve and adapt in response to environmental changes.
Research in normative multi-agent systems can be categorized into two branches. The ﬁrst branch
focuses on normative system architectures, norm representations, norm adherence and the
associated punitive or incentive measures. L￳pez y L￳pez and Marquez (2004) have designed an
architecture for normative BDI agents. Boella & van der Torre (2006) have proposed a distributed
architecture for normative agents. For an overview and comparison of different architectures refer to
Neumann's article (2010). Many researchers have used deontic logic to deﬁne and represent norms
(Garc￭a-Camino et al. 2006;Boella and van der Torre 2006). Several researchers have worked on
mechanisms for norm compliance and enforcement (L￳pez y L￳pez et al. 2002;Aldewereld et al.
2006;Axelrod 1986). A recent development is the research on emotion-based mechanisms for norm
enforcement (Staller and Petta 2001;Scheve et al. 2006). Conte and Castelfranchi (1999) have
worked on an integrated view of norms. Their work tries to bridge the gap between the prescriptive
view of norms and the emergence of conventions from mere regularities using the cognitive abilities
of an agent.
The second branch of research is related to emergence of norms. Several researchers have worked
on both prescriptive (top-down) and emergent (bottom-up) approaches to norms. In a top-down
approach an authoritative leader or a normative advisor prescribes what the norm of the society
should be (Verhagen 2001). In the bottom-up approach, the agents come up with a norm through
learning mechanisms (Shoham and Tennenholtz 1992;Sen and Airiau 2007). Researchers have used
sanctioning mechanisms (Axelrod 1986) and reputation mechanisms (Castelfranchi et al. 1998) for
enforcing norms. An overview of different mechanisms used by researchers for the research on
norms is provided by Savarimuthu and Craneﬁeld (2009).
The work reported in this paper falls under the bottom-up approach to the study of norms. Many
researchers in this approach have experimented with game-theoretical models for norm emergence
(Axelrod 1986;Shoham and Tennenholtz 1992). Agents using these models learn to choose a
strategy that maximizes utility. The agents in these works do not possess the notion of "normative
expectation". Many research works assume that norms exist in the society and the focus is on how
the norms can be regulated in an institutional setting such as electronic institutions (Arcos et al.
2005).
Very few have investigated how an agent comes to know the norms of the society (Andrighetto et al.
2007;Savarimuthu et al. 2009). Researchers involved in the EMIL project (Andrighetto et al. 2007)
are working on a cognitive architecture for norm emergence. They aim to deliver a simulation-based
theory of norm innovation, where norm innovation is deﬁned as the two-way dynamics of an inter-
agent process and an intra-agent process. The inter-agent process results in the emergence of
norms where the micro interactions produce macro behaviour (norms). The intra-agent process
refers to what goes inside an agent's mind so that it can recognize what the norms of the society are.
This approach uses cognitive agents that examine interactions between agents and are able to
recognize what the norms could be. The work reported here differs from the work done in EMIL
project in two ways. Firstly, in our architecture we have chosen "reaction" or "signalling" (positive and
negative) to be a top-level construct for identifying potential norms when the norm of a society is
being shaped. We note that a sanction not only may imply a monetary punishment, it could also be
an action that could invoke emotions (such as an agent yelling at another might invoke shame or
embarrassment on another agent), which can help in norm spreading. Agents can recognize such
actions based on their previous experience. Secondly, based on association rule mining (Ceglar and
Roddick 2006), a data mining technique, we propose an algorithm for norm inference, called the
Obligation Norm Inference (ONI) algorithm, which can be adapted by an autonomous agent for
ﬂexible norm identiﬁcation. To the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to use a data mining
approach for recognizing norms in an agent society.
 Overview of the norm identiﬁcation architecture
In this section we provide an overview of the norm identiﬁcation framework (called the norm engine)
proposed previously by Savarimuthu et al. (2010) for an agent to infer norms in the agent society in
which it is situated. Social learning theory (Bandura 1977) suggests that new behaviour can be learnt
through the observation of punishment and rewards. It has been noted that social monitoring (i.e. the
observation of agent actions) (Conte and Dignum 2001) and social learning (Conte and Paolucci
2001) can be used to identify norms in the society. An agent employing the architecture makes use of
social monitoring and learning to infer norms (Savarimuthu et al. 2010).
Figure 1 shows the internal agent architecture for norm identiﬁcation. An agent employing this








Figure 1. Architecture of the norm identiﬁcation framework of an agent
Step 1: An agent perceives the events in the environment in which it is situated.
Step 2: When an agent perceives an event, it stores the event in its belief base. The events
observed by an observer are of two types: regular events and signalling events. In the context of a
restaurant, a regular event is an event such as an agent ordering an item. "Special events" are
signalling events that agents understand to be either encouraging or discouraging certain behaviour.
For example when an agent orders a particular item but does not pay in accordance with a norm of
the society, the agent can be sanctioned by the restaurant manager or the waiter. When the client is
obliged to pay for the items ordered before leaving the restaurant, the waiter may shame the client by
yelling or can even report this to authorities such as the police. Let us assume that the signal in this
context is the occurrence of the shaming event which is a form of a sanction. The framework
assumes that an agent has the ability to recognize signalling events based on its previous
experience. Another example of a norm in this context is that a restaurant may have a social norm
that the customers are expected to tip the waiter before departing the restaurant. A customer may be
sanctioned by the waiter agent. The sanction here could be a yell or shout action.
Step 3: When a special event occurs, the agent stores the special event in the special events base.
It should be noted that all events are stored in an agent's belief base but only special events are
stored in the special events base.
Step 4: If the perceived event is a special event, an agent checks if there exists a norm in its
personal norm ( p-norm) base or the group norm ( g-norm) base. An agent may possess some p-
norms based on its past experience or preference. A p-norm is the personal value of an agent. For
example an agent may consider that every agent should tip after having a meal in the restaurant. A p-
norm may vary across agents, since a society may be made up agents with different backgrounds
and experiences. A g-norm is a group norm that an agent infers, based on its personal interactions
as well as the interactions it observes in the society. An agent infers g-norms using the norm
inference component of the framework.
The norm inference component is the main component of this architecture which employs sequence
mining approach to identify norms (discussed in detail in Section 4). When a special event occurs an
agent may decide to invoke its norm inference component to identify whether a previously unknown
norm may have resulted in the occurrence of the special event. In the context of the restaurant
scenario, an agent observing a sanctioning event may invoke its norm inference component to ﬁnd
out what events that had happened in the past (or that had not happened in the past) may have
triggered the occurrence of the special event. The invocation of the norm inference component may
result in the identiﬁcation of a g-norm, in which case it is added to the g-norm base.
An agent, being an autonomous entity, can also decide not to invoke its norm inference component
for every occurrence of a special event but may decide to invoke it periodically. When it invokes the
norm inference component, it may ﬁnd a new g-norm which it adds to its g-norm base. If it does not
ﬁnd a g-norm, the agent may change some of its norm inference parameters and repeat the process
again in order to ﬁnd a g-norm or may wait to collect more information.
At regular intervals of time an agent re-evaluates the g-norms it currently has, to check whether
those norms hold. When it ﬁnds that a g-norm does not apply, it removes the norm from the g-norm
base. The operational details of the norm inference component are explained in Section 4.3. What an
agent does with the norms once it has inferred the norms is out of the scope of this paper.
When it ﬁnds that a g-norm does not apply (e.g. if it does not ﬁnd any evidence of sanctions), it












 Obligation norm identiﬁcation
In this section we explain how obligation norms can be identiﬁed using the obligation norm inference
(ONI) algorithm proposed here. First, we describe the domain in which an obligation norm is
identiﬁed. Second, we describe how the events are stored by an agent. Third, we describe how the
ONI algorithm can be used by an agent to infer norms.
Restaurant scenario
Let us assume that agents are situated in a restaurant in a virtual environment (e.g. Second Life). A
new agent coming to a restaurant may not be aware of the protocol associated with ordering and
paying for food items and the associated norms. For example, the protocol of a restaurant might be to
ﬁrst order and pay for the food before consuming the food while the protocol of another restaurant
may be that the agent can consume the food and pay the bill at the end. A norm associated with the
restaurants could be that the agent is expected to pay a tip after paying the bill or pay a tip along with
the bill. This may vary from one culture to another. For example, in the USA it is expected to pay a tip
while in New Zealand a tip is not expected. Depending upon one's location, failure to follow the norms
may result in a sanction. In this paper we explain how an agent can identify the norms and the
protocols in a particular context (i.e. the restaurant scenario).
Event storage components
Let us assume that an agent is situated in a restaurant where multiple agents come to the restaurant,
consume food and move out of the restaurant. Let us also assume that a new agent is not aware of
the norms or the protocols of the restaurant. In this architecture an agent would ﬁrst observe the
interactions that occur between the agents in the society. The interactions could be of two types. The
ﬁrst type of interaction is the one in which the agent itself is involved and is called a personnel
interaction (e.g. eating). The second type of interaction is an interaction between other agents that is
observed by an observer agent, referred to as an observed interaction. The agent records these
interactions (as events) in its belief base. An agent in the society can assume one or more of the
following three roles: a participant (P) that is involved in a personal interaction, an observer (O) and a
signaller (S). The participants are the waiter agent and the customer agent. The signaller is a waiter
agent.
In the restaurant scenario, the agent is aware of the actions performed by an agent, which are the
arrival of an agent (arrive), ordering an item (order), eating the ordered food (eat), paying for the
ordered food (pay), tipping the waiter (tip) and departing the restaurant (depart). The agent also has
the ability to recognize a signalling action such as yell orshame [1]. Signalling events can either be
positive (rewards) or negative (sanctions). In this work we focus on the negative signals (i.e.
sanctions)
Let us assume that a new agent (an observer) is situated in the restaurant. The observer records
interactions that occur in the restaurant. Let us assume that a sanctioning event occurs. Even
though an observer may know that a sanctioning event has occurred, it may not know the exact
reason for sanctioning (i.e. it may not know the norm because it only observes a sequence of actions
and the agent does not know which of the events that happened in the past or the absence of which
event(s) triggered the sanction). It will infer norms using the norm inference mechanism.
An event that is perceived by an agent consists of an event index, an observed action, and the
agent(s) participating in that event. For example an agent observing an agent A arriving at the
restaurant will represent this as happens (1,arrive,A). This implies the observer believes that the ﬁrst
event was generated by agent A which arrives in the restaurant.
A sample representation of events observed by an agent is given in Figure 2. An agent situated in an
environment can sense these actions through observation or through action logs that may be
available[2].
Figure 2. Representation of events
An agent records these events in its belief base. Event 7 is a sanctioning event, where agent W
sanctions agent A. The reason for the sanction is that agent A failed to tip agent W. For an observer it
may not be possible to know the reason for this sanction unless it was speciﬁed a priori by the
agent's designer. In open agent societies, the norms of the society may not be known to an agent
ahead of time. Additionally, the norms may evolve over time. In order to infer a norm of the society the
agent will make use of the norm inference mechanism proposed here.
The agents have a ﬁltering mechanism, which identiﬁes signalling events and stores them in the
special events base. It should be noted that special events, such as yell and shame, are categorized
by an agent as sanctioning events and they are stored in the special events base as a sanction
event.
Norm inference component
An agent may choose to invoke its norm inference component based on its preference. For example,
it can invoke the component every time it perceives a signalling action, or it may invoke this
component periodically.
The norm inference component of an agent is made up of two sub-components. The ﬁrst sub-
component makes use of the Obligation Norm Inference (ONI) algorithm to generate candidate
obligation norms. Candidate obligation norms are the norms that an agent identiﬁes as potential
candidates that may become the norms in a society. The second sub-component is the norm
veriﬁcation component, which veriﬁes whether a candidate norm can be identiﬁed as a norm in the
society.
This sub-section is organized as follows. Firstly we explain the parameters of the ONI algorithm.
Secondly we describe the internal details of the ONI algorithm using the restaurant example.













The parameters that are used in the Obligation Norm Inference algorithm are explained below.
History Length (HL): An agent keeps a history of the observed interactions for certain window of
time. This period of time is represented by the History Length (HL) parameter. For example, if HL is
set to 20, an agent will keep the last 20 events it observes in it its memory. An agent constructs an
event episode (EE) based on events that are stored in its history. Construction of event episodes is
described in the next sub-section.
Event Sequences (ES): An event sequence is the record of actions that an agent observes in the
history. For example the event sequence observed by an agent where HL=8 is given in Figure 2.
Special Events Set (SES): An agent has a set of events it identiﬁes to be special. These events are
the signalling events. For example, the special event set can contain events such as yell (SES = {
yell, shame }). An agent also has the capability to categorize events into two types, sanctions and
rewards. For example the actions mentioned above can be identiﬁed as sanctions.
Unique Events Set (UES): This set contains the number of distinct events that occur within a period
of time. For example, a unique events set for the example given in Figure 2 contains the following
events[3], UES = { arrive, order, eat, pay, tip, sanction, wait, depart }.
Occurrence Probability (OP): The occurrence probability of an event E is given by the following
formula.
OP(E) = Number of occurrences of E/Total number of events in ES
Window size (WS): When an agent wants to infer norms, it looks into its history for a certain number
of recent events preceding a sanction. For example, if the WS is set to 3, an agent creates an event
episode (EE) with the last three events that were exchanged between agents involved in the
interaction (e.g. a pair of agents: the customer and the waiter) that precede a sanction. It should be
noted that an EE is a subsequence[4] of ES.
Norm Identiﬁcation Threshold (NIT): When coming up with candidate norms, an agent may not be
interested in events that have a lower probability of being a norm. For example, if an agent sets NIT
to be 50 (in a scale from 0 to 100), it indicates it is interested in ﬁnding all sub-episodes[5] of an event
episode that have at least a 50% chance of being a candidate norm. The algorithm uses the NIT on
two occasions. As the values of NIT for each of the occasions can be varied by an agent, there are
two variables used which are NITa, and NITb.
Norm Inference Frequency (NIF): An agent invokes the component periodically. The agent has a
parameter called the norm inference frequency (NIF) that speciﬁes the time interval between two
invocations of the norm inference component.
Obligation Norm Inference (ONI) algorithm
In this section we describe the Obligation Norm Inference (ONI) algorithm.
Overview of the algorithm
There are four main steps involved in the Obligation Norm Inference algorithm (see Algorithm 1).
First, event episodes of a certain length are extracted from event sequences that an agent observes.
These event episodes are stored in the event episode list (EEL). Second, based on the events in the
special event set (e.g. sanctioning events), the event episodes in EEL are separated into two lists.
The ﬁrst list, called the Special Event Episode List (SEEL) contains all event episodes that contain at
least one sanctioning event. The second list, called the Normal Event Episode List (NEEL) contains
all event episodes that do not contain sanctioning events. Third, using SEEL, all sub-episodes which
have occurrence probabilities greater than or equal to NITa are extracted and stored in the Norm-
Related Event Episode List (NREEL) based on a modiﬁed version of the WINEPI algorithm
(Savarimuthu et al. 2010). The modiﬁcation was to include the identiﬁcation of sequences that are
resultant products of permutation with repetition (discussed in Section 4.31). Fourth, for each event
episode in NREEL, all supersequences are extracted from NEEL and stored in a temporary list
called tempEEList. Based on the supersequences stored in tempEEList, the modiﬁed version of the
WINEPI algorithm can identify all permutations of supersequences with occurrence probabilities
greater than or equal to NITb. These are stored in the Candidate Obligation Norm List (CONL).
These four steps are explained in detail in the following sub-sections. Note that a table containing all
acronyms used in this paper and their expansions are given in the Appendix.
Algorithm 1. Obligation Norm Inference algorithm (main algorithm)
Creating event episodes
An agent records other agents' actions in its belief base. We call the sequence of events that were
recorded in the belief base event sequences (ES). Let us assume that there are four agents A, B, C
and W in the restaurant as given in Figure 2. A and B are customers while W is the waiter agent. Let
us assume that agent C is the observer. Agent A arrives ﬁrst and shortly afterwards agent B arrives.
Agent A orders food from agent W. Agent A eats and then pays. Agent A then departs. Agent A is
sanctioned by W. Agent B orders food from agent W.
An agent has a certain history length (HL). An agent at any point of time stores the history of
observed interactions for the length equal to HL. When the norm inference component is invoked, the






agents. We call the retrieved event sequence the event episode (EE). A sample event episode from
the viewpoint of an observer (agent C) is given below. The set on the left hand side of the colon
indicates that the agents involved in the interaction are A and W. To the right of the colon is the event
episode. A hyphen separates one event from the next.
{A,W} : (happens(3, order, A,W) — happens(4, eat,A )— happens(5, pay, A,W)
— happens(6, depart,A) — happens(7, sanction,W,A))
Based on what an agent observes (e.g. the event sequence given in Figure 2), the observer may
assume that something that agent A did in the past may have caused the sanction. It could also be
the failure of agent A to perform (a) certain action(s) that might have caused a sanction. In this work
we concentrate on the latter[6]. Agent C then extracts the sequence of events (the event episode)
that involved A and W based on the event sequence stored in its history. To simplify the notation, only
the ﬁrst letter of each event will be mentioned from here on (e.g. p for pay) and also the agent names
are omitted. As the sequence caters for temporal ordering of events, the event ids are omitted. Thus
the event episode for interactions between agents A and W shown above will be represented as
{A,W} : o — e — p — d — s
Figure 3 shows a sample event episode list (EEL) that contains ten events involving a pair of agents
that are observed by another agent where HL=6. Note that the Unique Event Set (UES) in this case
includes events a, o, e, p, t, d, w and s which stand for arrive, order, eat, pay, tip, depart, wait and
sanction respectively.
Figure 3. Event episode list (EEL)
Creating special and normal event episode lists
Note that some event episodes in EEL have sanctions as one of the events. The agent identiﬁes the
sanction events from the special events set (SES). Using EEL, an agent creates two lists for further
processing, one with event episodes that contain a sanctioning event and the other containing event
episodes without sanctions. The list that contains event episodes with sanctioning events is called
the special event episode list (SEEL). The other list is called the normal event episode list (NEEL).
The SEEL obtained from our example EEL is given in the left in Figure 4. NEEL has the remaining
episodes that do not contain a sanctioning action (shown in the right of Figure 4).
Figure 4. SEEL (left) and NEEL (right)
Generating the norm-related event list (NREEL)
From the SEEL, an agent can identify events that have the potential to be associated with sanctions.
For example, from the SEEL shown in the left of Figure 4, the agent may infer that the sub-episodes
p-d, p, or d could be the reason for a sanction as they occur in all the event episodes in SEEL. In the
case of prohibition norms the events that precede a sanction can be potentially linked to sanction due
to causality. In the case of obligation norms, it is the absence of an event or a sequence of events
that might be the cause of the sanction. In both these types of norms, the agent has to identify the
sequences of events that occur frequently before the occurrence of a sanctioning action. In the case
of a prohibition norm, the frequency of occurrence may correlate with norm identiﬁcation. In the case
of an obligation norm, the agent ﬁrst has to ﬁnd the frequently occurring sequence(s), which are then
stored in the norm-related event list (NREEL). Let us refer to an event episode in NREEL as ʱ.
Second, an agent has to identify all the supersequences of ʱ in NEEL with an occurrence probability
greater than or equal to NITa, which are added to the candidate obligation norm list (CONL). The
construction of NREEL is discussed in this sub-section and the construction of CONL is discussed
in the next sub-section.
In order to identify these norm-related events the agent uses the Candidate Norm Identiﬁcation (CNI)
algorithm (Savarimuthu et al. 2010) a modiﬁed version of the WINEPI algorithm (Mannila et al. 1997)
which is based on association rule mining. Association rule mining (Ceglar and Roddick 2006) is one
of the well known ﬁelds of data mining where relationships between items in a database are
discovered. For example, interesting rules such as 80% of people who bought diapers also bought
beers can be identiﬁed from a database. Some well known algorithms in the data mining ﬁeld can be
used for mining frequently occurring episodes (i.e. mining association rules) (Agrawal and Srikant
1994;Mannila et al. 1997). A limitation of the well-known Apriori algorithm ( Agrawal and Srikant 1994)
is that it considers combinations of events but not permutations (e.g. it does not distinguish between
event sequences p-d and d-p). WINEPI (Mannila et al., 1997) addresses this issue, but it lacks
support for identifying sequences that are resultants of permutations with repetition. For example,
from sub-episodes of length one, e.g. p and d, the algorithm can generate sub-episodes of length two
which are p-d and d-p, but not p-p and d-d. Permutations with repetition are important because there
could be a norm which sanctions an agent from performing the same action twice. The modiﬁcation,
reported previously (Savarimuthu et al. 2010), can identify candidate norms that are obtained by4.32
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considering "permutations with repetition" when constructing sub-episodes.
Based on the SEEL, an agent can generate the NREEL. Figure 5 shows the SEEL on the left of the
arrow and the NREEL generated from the SEEL on the right of the arrow when NITa is set to 0. The
occurrence probability of an event episode in NREEL is given in square brackets. When NITa is set
to 0, all possible subsequences of event episodes in the SEEL are generated. When NITa is set to
100 the algorithm identiﬁes the following norm-related event episode list { p-d, p, d }. An agent, being
an autonomous entity, can vary the NITa parameter to identify the norm-related events. Note that if an
event episode is frequent then all its subsequences are also frequent. For example if p-d appears
100% of the time (i.e. the occurrence probability is 1), all its subsequences also appear 100% of the
time.
Figure 5. SEEL (left) and NREEL (right)
Generating the candidate obligation norm list (CONL)
The pseudocode for generating CONL is given in Algorithm 2. In order to identify the obligation
norms, the agent has to identify those supersequences in NEEL that contain the event episodes in
NREEL. These supersequences are stored in a list (tempEEList in this case).
Algorithm 2. Pseudocode to create the candidate obligation norm list (CONL)
Based on the supersequences stored in tempEEList, the Candidate Norm Inference (CNI) algorithm
(Savarimuthu et al. 2010) can identify all permutations of supersequences whose occurrence
probabilities are greater than or equal to NITb. Such supersequences are stored in the candidate
obligation norm list (CONL). For example, let us suppose that the event epsiode p-d is the only event
episode stored in the NREEL. Figure 6 shows the NEEL on the left of the arrow and the tempEEList
that is generated from the NEEL on the right. Note that the NEEL on the left contains six event
episodes but tempEEList contains two event episodes that contain p-d out of six. These two event
episodes are supersequences of p-d.








From tempEEList the CONL can be generated. The left hand side of Figure 7 shows the tempEEList.
The right hand side of Figure 7 contains all permutations of supersequences of p-d that can be
obtained from tempEEList and their occurrence probabilities in tempEEList (in square brackets).
Assuming that NITb is set to 100, the supersequences that will be identiﬁed as members of CONL
are p-t-d and e-p-t-d. Both these supersequences have an occurrence probability of 1. As the
occurrence probabilities of o-e-p-t-d and a-o-e-p-t-d are less than NITb, these are not included in the
CONL. Note that the modiﬁed WINEPI algorithm is used twice, the ﬁrst time to obtain the NREEL
from the SEEL (not shown here) and the second time for obtaining the CONL from the NEEL using
the NREEL (line 9 of Algorithm 2). For every event episode in the NREEL, a new CONL is
generated. Having compiled a set containing candidate obligation norms, the agent passes this
information to the norm veriﬁcation component to identify norms. This process is iterated until there
are no elements in NREEL. The norm veriﬁcation process is explained in the next sub-section.
Figure 7. tempEEList (left) and permutations of supersequences containing p-d in tempEEList
(right)
Norm veriﬁcation
In order to ﬁnd whether a candidate norm is a norm of the society, the agent asks another agent in its
proximity. This happens periodically (e.g. once in every 10 iterations). An agent A can ask another
agent B, by choosing the ﬁrst candidate norm (say p-t-d) for which it has the highest occurrence
probability and asks B if it knows whether the obligation norm OA,W (t|p) is a norm of the society (i.e.
an agent is obliged to tip after paying for the food ordered). If the response is afﬁrmative, A stores this
norm in its set of identiﬁed norms. If not, A moves on to the next candidate norm in its list. In the case
of the running example, the second candidate norm e-p-t-d is chosen to be communicated to the
other agent. It asks another agent (e.g. the agent that is the closest) whether it thinks that the given
candidate norm is a norm of the society. If it responds positively, the agent infers OA,W (t|(e — p)) to
be a norm. If the response is negative, this norm is stored in the bottom of the candidate norm list.
This process continues until a norm is found or no norm is found from the event episodes in the
candidate norm list. Even in the case of successfully identifying a candidate norm, the agent
continues the process to identify any co-existing norms.
Figure 8. Candidate norms (left) and identiﬁed norm (right)
Note that an agent will have two sets of norms: candidate norms and identiﬁed norms. Figure 8
shows the two sets of norms: the candidate norms on the left of the arrow and the identiﬁed norm on
the right. Once an agent identiﬁes the norms of the system and ﬁnds that the norms identiﬁed have
been stable for a certain period of time, it can forgo using the norm inference component for a certain
amount of time (based on the norm inference frequency (NIF)). It invokes the norm inference
component periodically to check if the norms of the society have changed, in which case it replaces
the norms in the identiﬁed list with the new ones (or deletes the norms which are no more applicable).
Discussion on norm veriﬁcation
The reason for having a norm veriﬁcation procedure is that the data mining approach isn't sufﬁcient
to solve the norm identiﬁcation problem to the fullest extent. For example let us assume that p-t, p
and t are identiﬁed as candidate norms (which occur 100% of the time). It can be that only one of
these is a norm in the society. While the data mining approach has narrowed down the search space
to 3 possible choices, it does not suggest which one of these three is the actual norm (because all
the three are equally signiﬁcant from a data mining perspective). To solve this problem, we have
used a social mechanism where agents ask other agents for norm veriﬁcation. There are two other
reasons for employing another agent as the norm veriﬁer.
First, an agent entering a society may not be interested to ﬁnd out all the norms of a society (an
agent might give a long list of norms followed in the society). It may be interested to ﬁnd the norms in
a particular context. An agent has to ﬁrst infer what the context is (by observing the interactions) and
then it can ask another agent in the neighborhood if its inference of a norm is valid (e.g. Am I obliged
to tip in this society?). In our view this is more effective (in terms of computation and memory
required) than asking another agent what the norms in the restaurant are, as there could be a long list
of norms that apply and most of those may not be of interest to an agent. As the agent has gathered
some evidence with regards to what the norm could be, the agent has not only identiﬁed the context
it is in but also can be conﬁdent in asking for norm referral (i.e. because it can precisely formulate its
query for norm identiﬁcation and also can be conﬁdent in its query which based on inference).
Second, an agent may not completely trust other agents in an open society. When an agent asks
another agent without norm inference, the other agent could potentially lie about a norm. So, an agent
may want to make sure that it identiﬁes candidate norms before it asks for norm veriﬁcation. This
process helps an agent from being cheated by the referrer agent if it were to ask what the norm is as
it knows that one of the candidate norms could potentially be a norm. Note that this doesn't solve the
lying problem as the referrer agent can lie when an agent asks if something is a norm in the society.
At the least, the mechanism allows the agent to have a set of candidate norms. The problem of lying
can be addressed in two ways. First, an agent could ask for norm veriﬁcation from many agents in
its neighbourhood. Second, an agent can verify whether its candidate norms hold by undertaking
actions that it observes to be sanctioned (e.g. by violating the tipping norm). Based on the outcome
of tests the agent carries out it can infer what the norms could be. This is a meta-level norm testing
mechanism of an agent. These mechanisms can be explored in the future.
 Experimental results
In this section we ﬁrst describe the experimental set-up in paragraphs 5.2 and 5.3. In the rest of the
sub-sections we describe the experiments that were conducted and also discuss the results
obtained.
Experimental set-up
We model agents in our virtual society in a two-dimensional space. This virtual restaurant
environment is shown in Figure 9. The agents can enter the restaurant and occupy one of the chairs
at a table. Each table has six chairs. Each agent has a visibility threshold. The visibility threshold of
the agent is governed by a Moore neighbourhood (Weisstein, 2010) of radius r. An agent can
observe actions of agents and the interactions that happen between two agents within its visibility
threshold. There are three types of agents in the simulation. They are non-tipping customers (NTC),5.3
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tipping customers (TC) and waiters (W). There are eight possible types of actions deﬁned in the
simulation system: arrive, order, eat, pay, tip, depart, wait and sanction. The NTC agents can arrive,
order, eat, pay and depart. The TC agents can arrive, order, eat, pay, tip and depart while the waiter
agents can wait on the customers and sanction[7]. The agents in this environment move from left to
right. An agent chooses a seat and occupies it. It can then order food, eat and then pay for the food.
The agent may tip the waiter. The agent may be sanctioned for not tipping. The agent can then depart
the restaurant. The agents that are at the edge of the two dimensional space can again re-appear in
the opposite side (i.e. a toroidal grid is implemented). The agents are represented as circles using
different colours. The NTCs are red, the TCs are green and the Ws are blue. The id of an agent and
the action it currently performs appear above the circle. At any time step an agent can perform one
action. When an agent does the same action over several steps it is recorded as one action. For
example, if the agent eats for 10 iterations, the eating action is counted as one action[8]. The same
holds for the arrival and the departure of an agent. All the agents make use of the norm inference
component to infer norms. The blue squares that appear within the circles represent the identiﬁcation
of a norm.
Figure 9. Snapshot of the simulation
The simulation parameters used in all the experiments are given in Table 1. A sample simulation can
be viewed on the web[9]. A basic version of the simulation program written in Java can be accessed
from the OpenABM repository[10].
Table 1: Simulation parameters
Parameters Values
Grid size
Total number of agents
Number of tipping customers




Norm inference threshold - a (NITa)
Norm inference threshold - b (NITb)
Window Size (WS)
Norm inference frequency (NIF)













Experiment 1 - Varying visibility threshold (V) and history length (HL)
In this experiment there were 50 agents out of which 25 were tipping customers (TC), 21 were non-
tipping customers (NTC), and 4 were waiter agents (W) who punished non-tipping customers
probabilistically. The simulated environment was a 50*50 grid as shown in Figure 9.
An agent has a visibility threshold which dictates how many cells an agent can see. A visibility




away from it on all sides. The agent also has certain amount of history regarding the actions
performed by other agents. When the history length is ﬁve, an agent stores the actions of all the
agents within its vicinity in the last 5 iterations.
Figure 10 shows the rate at which a society identiﬁes the obligation norm of tipping when the visibility
and the history lengths of agents are varied. In all the graphs in Figure 10, the x-axis shows the
iteration number and the y-axis shows the number of agents with the tipping norm.
Figure 10. Varying the visibility threshold and history length of agents
By keeping the history length constant and all the other parameters constant we varied the visibility
threshold for the agents. The top-left graph of Figure 10 shows the result of varying the visibility
threshold. It can be noted that as the visibility of the agents increased, the agents identiﬁed the
norms faster. This is because the agents were able to collect more evidence[11]. This can be
observed in all the graphs in Figure 10.
When the history length of an agent was increased the agents in the society inferred the norms
faster. When we compare the results shown in the top-right graph of Figure 10 with the results shown
in the top-left graph of Figure 10, it can be observed that as the history length increases the agents
infer the norms faster. This can be observed as we move from the top-left graph to the bottom-right
graph in Figure 10. When the history length was small, the event episode list may not contain all the
information to infer a norm. But when the history length is increased, an agent will have better
evidence to infer the norms.
Experiment 2 - Varying referral levels
Once an agent has identiﬁed a candidate norm, it asks other agents for norm identiﬁcation within its
visibility threshold. An agent can vary this parameter. It was noted that as the number of agents from
whom an agent asked for referral increased (see Figure 11), the norm identiﬁcation rate of the agents
in the society increased[12]. The norm inference frequency in this experiment was once every 50
iterations. Other parameters of this experiment were: NITa =100, NITb = 80, V=25, HL=50 and
WS=3.
Figure 11. Varying the number of agents contacted for norm identiﬁcation





We have studied the effect of changing the NIT thresholds (a and b) on the size of NREEL and
CONL that are generated by an agent. Figure 12 shows the size of the NREEL when NITa is varied.
When NITa is set low, the size of NREEL generated by an agent is large. This means that an agent
incurs a large amount of computation cost to generate NREEL. When an agent sets NITa high, the
size of NREEL is small. An agent, being an adaptive entity, can vary this parameter depending upon
its success in identifying a norm.
Figure 12. Size of NREEL when varying NITa
We also conducted experiments to show the impact of varying both NITa and NITb on the number of
candidate norms generated (see Figure 13). When NITa was set to 100 and NITb was set to 100, a
small set of candidate norms was generated (size = 9). When NITa was set to 100 and NITb was set
to 50, 35 different candidate norms were generated. When NITa was set to 50 and NITb was set to
100, 37 candidate norms were generated. When NITa was set to 50 and NITb was set to 50, 57
candidate norms were generated. If an agent sets the NIT value high, the number of candidate norms
that is generated is low. The number of candidate norms that are generated has an impact on the
norm veriﬁcation stage. The less the number of candidate norms, less the amount of time taken for
norm veriﬁcation. An agent can change these two parameters to adapt to the current situation. For
example, if an agent sets the NIT values to be high and it does not ﬁnd a norm it can decrease the
value for the next norm inference instance.
Figure 13. Number of candidate norms generated when varying NITa and NITb
Experiment 4 - Varying the Window Size (WS)
The objectives of this experiment are two-fold. They are to show that
As WS increases, the accuracy of norm identiﬁcation increases (i.e. the number of false
positives decreases and the number of candidate norms generated decreases)
As WS is varied, different normative protocols associated with the norms can be identiﬁed.
Accuracy of norm identiﬁcation
By keeping other parameters constant we varied the Window Size (WS) of norm identiﬁcation. The
results of varying an agent's WS for 20 norm inference instances[13] is given in Figure 14. The
success rate in identifying three different categories of norms are also given in Figure 14. These
three categories are 1) the only candidate norm identiﬁed is the tipping norm 2) tipping is identiﬁed as
one of the candidate norms and 3) the tipping norm is not found or no norm is found). When WS is
set to 1, the agent identiﬁed the tipping norm to be the only candidate norm 5% of the time. 65% of the
time, it identiﬁed the tipping norm as one of the candidate norms. In other words, the agent also had
identiﬁed other candidate norms. These other candidate norms are false positives which are pruned
during the norm veriﬁcation stage. Remaining 30% of the time, the agent either did not identify any
norms or did not identify tipping as one of the norms.
As WS is increased, the accuracy of norm identiﬁcation increases (i.e. the success of the agent in
identifying tipping as the only norm increases). When WS=2, the agent identiﬁes tipping to be the
only norm 30% of the time. When WS=3, the agent identiﬁes it 55% of the time and when WS is set




Figure 14. Impact of varying the Window Size (WS) on norm identiﬁcation
When WS increases, the agent's load in norm veriﬁcation decreases (shown in Figure 15). When
WS=1, about four candidate norms were generated in each norm inference cycle. When WS=2, on
average, more than two candidate norms were generated in each cycle and when WS is set to three,
fewer than 2 norms were generated in each iteration. When WS was set to 5, one norm was
generated in each iteration. When the number of candidate norms generated is less, the amount of
norm veriﬁcation that needs to be done is less which results in a reduction of communication
between the agents.
Figure 15. Average number of candidate norms generated per norm inference instance
There is no further improvement in the success of tipping norm identiﬁcation when moving from
WS=5 to WS=10 because the domain model supports a maximum of ﬁve different events that occur
before a sanction (i.e. a-o-e-p-d). If the domain model is changed, the WS will need to be changed
accordingly.
Identifying normative protocols
We deﬁne normative protocols to be the order of the occurrence of events (protocols) associated
with a norm. For example, the protocol a-o-e-p-t-d deﬁnes the sequence that normally an agent
arrives, occupies a seat and orders food, eats, pays, tips and then departs. The focus of this
experiment is to demonstrate that an agent, by changing the WS, can have a partial or complete view
of what the normative protocol might be. For example, when WS is set to 1, the agent identiﬁes only
one event that precedes the sanctioning event. Hence, the size of the normative protocol identiﬁed
will be two[14]. If WS is set to ﬁve, the size of the normative protocol that can be identiﬁed can vary







Figure 16. Normative protocols generated by an agent for varying window sizes
From Figure 16, it can be observed that when WS is one, the agent identiﬁed PT[16] as the protocol,
about 90% of the time. When WS was set to three, it identiﬁed, EPTD to be the normative protocol
about 88% of the time. When WS was set to ﬁve and ten, EPTD and AOEPTD were the top two
normative protocols that were identiﬁed. It should be noted that as WS increases, the size of the
normative protocol identiﬁed increases. Also, the normative protocols identiﬁed for lower values of
WS are subsets of the normative protocols identiﬁed using higher values of WS.
This experiment shows that an agent not only infers norms but also the associated normative
protocol. An agent's view of the normative protocol depends on the WS value of that agent. Note that,
given a protocol, an agent can easily identify the norm associated with that protocol. For example,
assuming that an agent knows the protocol in a restaurant is a-o-e-p-d (e.g. if this is given to the
agent by the designer), an agent can easily identify a-o-e-p-t-d as the normative protocol based on
observations of events. In our case, the normative protocol is inferred by the agent, without the
protocol being given to the agent explicitly.
The norm and the protocol are inferred through the norm identiﬁcation mechanism. If the normative
protocol were to be a-o-p-e-t-d in a restaurant (i.e. pay before eating and then tip), our approach will
be able to identify the norm and the normative protocol.
Experiment 5 - Adaptability of an agent in identifying norms
An agent in our system can ﬂexibly modify the history length (HL) based on whether it is successful
in identifying a norm. If an agent does not infer norms when HL=25, it can increase the HL. If it has
identiﬁed if the norm holds at a particular HL, the agent will check after a certain number of iterations
whether the norm still holds. If it holds, it will try to decrease the HL and check whether the norm can
be identiﬁed. If it can be identiﬁed the agent will decrease its HL further. The objective for reducing
the HL is to reduce the amount of computation required to ﬁnd a norm. The agent will be better off in
terms of the computation required if it can ﬁnd the same norm when it lowers the amount of history it
has to store.
The top line in Figure 17 shows the adaptive history length of an agent when it tries to identify a norm.
The bottom line shows whether the agent has found a norm (a value of 5) or not (a value of 0). An
agent initially starts with an HL of 25. When it does not ﬁnd the norm when HL=25, it increases its HL
by ﬁve. This increases to a maximum value of 50. Once a norm is found, the agent tries to check
whether the same norm can be found for a lower value of HL. It can be inferred from Figure 17 that in
iteration 75, the agent found the norm when the HL was 40. When it tried to reduce HL to 35, the
norm was not found. The agent then increased the HL to 50 by incrementing it by 5 in the next few
norm inference instances. The agent was able to ﬁnd the norm again in iteration 250. It then
decreased the HL to 45 and it found the norm again. When HL was set to 40 it did not ﬁnd the norm,
hence the agent increased HL to 45. This graph shows that an agent is adaptive in terms of the
history length it stores. Dynamic adjustment of history length will be beneﬁcial to the agent when
norms are changing.
Figure 17. Adaptive history of an agent
We have also experimented with varying the history lengths of an agent with and without the ability of
having an adaptive history length (i.e. static HL vs. dynamic HL). When HL is static the agent has a5.24
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constant HL throughout the simulation. When HL is dynamic, the agent can change its HL based on
whether it has identiﬁed a norm. It can be seen from Figure 18 that when dynamic HL is used, an
agent is able to infer the norms faster. Note that when HL was set to ﬁve (static HL=5), the agent
found the norm only after 99 norm inference instances. When dynamic HL was used by the agent, it
inferred the norm in 28 inference instances. For larger values of HL there isn't a signiﬁcant difference
between static and adaptive HL. This is because for large HL values the agent would have collected
enough evidence from observing the other agents regarding the norm (i.e. the evidence of a
sanction). For smaller HL values, the agent does not have enough evidence regarding the sanction.
Hence, dynamically adapting the history length produces better results for an agent.
Figure 18. Static vs. adaptive history
Similar to varying the history length dynamically, an adaptive agent can also vary its visibility
threshold, the number of referrals, norm inference thresholds and the window size for identifying
norms. The effects of changing these parameters have been reported in experiments 2 to 4.
Experiment 6 - Identifying dynamic norm change
An agent should have the ability to dynamically add newly identiﬁed norms and remove norms that
do not hold. This experiment demonstrates that norms can be added, removed and modiﬁed by an
agent dynamically depending upon the environmental conditions. The ability to change norms is
important for an adaptive agent so that it can ﬂexibly adopt norms. An agent, on identifying a norm,
evaluates whether the norm holds at regular intervals of time. If the norm does not hold, it removes
the norm from its norm base. Figure 19 shows the results of dynamic norm change in a society.
There are two lines in the graph. The top line shows the proportion of agents in the society with a
norm at any given iteration. The line that appears in the bottom shows whether punishers are present
in the society. A (dummy) value of 5 means that there are punishers in the society and a value of 0
means that the punishers are not present in the society. In this experiment, the punishers do not
punish[17] from iterations 300 to 600. In this experiment, having found a norm, an agent checks for
the validity of the norm once again after 50 iterations. If the norm is found again, then the agent does
not delete the norm. If the norm is not found, it removes the norm from its norm base. When the
punishers do not punish, the norm is not inferred. As the norm is not inferred, the agent removes the
norm. It can be observed that the agents start losing the norm from iteration 400 and all the agents in
the society have successfully removed the norm by iteration 500. In iteration 700 some of the agents
have identiﬁed the norm again and all the agents have identiﬁed the norm in iteration 850[18].
Figure 19. Dynamic norm change in an agent society
 Discussion
The main contributions of the paper are the following.
1.  The issue of norm identiﬁcation has not been dealt with by many researchers in the ﬁeld of
normative multi-agent systems. To this end, in this paper we have demonstrated how one type
of norm - obligation norms can be identiﬁed by an agent using the Obligation Norm
Identiﬁcation (ONI) algorithm. For this purpose we have made use of the norm identiﬁcation
architecture (Savarimuthu et al. 2010). When compared to identifying prohibition norms,
identifying obligation norms is difﬁcult because with a prohibition norm it is usually the
occurrence of a particular event or a sequence of events that is the reason for a sanction to
occur. In obligation norms, it is the absence of an event that is the cause of a sanction.
Association rule mining algorithms only cater for the extraction of interesting sequences that
are present in an event sequence. They cannot identify sequences when data items are
missing. The Obligation Norm Inference (ONI) algorithm presented here can be used to




2.  Second, using a simple example (tipping norm identiﬁcation in a restaurant), we have
demonstrated how the norm inference mechanism works. In particular we have demonstrated
the following:
An agent can modify the parameters of the system based on whether it is successful in
identifying a norm (e.g. the history length).
An agent can add, remove and modify norms in a dynamically changing environment.
An agent using this mechanism can increase the accuracy of norm identiﬁcation and reduce
the number of false positives generated.
An agent is able to identify the normative protocols.
We believe the mechanism proposed in this paper can be used to identify obligation norms in several
settings. For example, the norm identiﬁcation architecture can be used to infer norms in Massively
Multi-player Online Games (MMOGs) such as World of Warcraft (WoW). Players involved in
massively multi-player games perform actions in an environment to achieve a goal. They may play
as individuals or in groups. When playing a cooperation game (e.g. players forming groups to slay a
dragon), individual players may be able to observe proscriptions of actions (prohibition norms) and
obligations that need to be satisﬁed (obligation norms). The mechanism proposed in this paper can
be used to identify norms that are being formed. For example a norm could be that a player who has
helped another player twice to escape from a dragon expects the other player to help him escape
from the dragon if the need arises. This norm may not be part of the protocol deﬁned for playing the
game but may evolve during the game. Such a norm can be identiﬁed by this mechanism. Secondly,
the same principle can be used in virtual environments such as Second Life to infer norms. The
mechanism reported in this work can be used to identify co-existing norms (e.g. OX,Y (t|(e — p)) and
OX,Y (p|(o — e))
[19]
 can be identiﬁed). In the future we intend to extend our work to identify conﬂicting
norms and how these conﬂicting norms can be handled by an agent
[20]
.
A possible extension to this work is to allow the tipping customers to impose sanctions on non-
tipping customers. We believe the impact of this addition will be the faster convergence of norms in
the society. We note that the emphasis of the current work has been on norm identiﬁcation.
Another potential addition to this work is on identifying conditional norms. For example, in one society,
an agent may tip 10% of the bill while in another society an agent might be obliged to tip 20% of the
bill. Depending upon what an agent has observed, agents may have subtly different norms. Both
these agents could still infer the obligation norm but the conditions they had noticed can be different.
 Conclusion
This paper addresses the question of how obligation norms can be identiﬁed in an agent society. To
this end, this paper proposes the Obligation Norm Inference (ONI) algorithm. The paper uses the
norm inference architecture for identifying obligation norms. An agent that employs the ONI algorithm
makes use of a data mining approach to infer obligation norms. An agent can dynamically add,
remove and modify norms and also can adaptively vary parameters of the system in order to identify
norms. Experimental results in the context of a virtual restaurant scenario have been discussed.
 Appendix
Acronyms and expansions




SES Special Event Set
UES Unique Event Set
WS Window Size
NIT Norm Identiﬁcation Threshold
NIF Norm Inference Frequency
ONI Obligation Norm Inference
EEL Event Episode List
NEEL Normal Event Episode List
SEEL Special Event Episode List
NREEL Norm Related Event Episode List
tempEEList temporary Event Episode List
CONL Candidate Obligation Norm List
 Notes
1 We assume that sanctioning events such as an agent yelling at another agent for violating a norm
or an agent publicly shaming another agent are observable. We note that recognizing and
categorizing a sanctioning event is a difﬁcult problem. In this architecture it is assumed that such a
mechanism exists (e.g. based on an agent's past experience).
2 For example, in Massively Multi-Player Online Role Playing Games (MMORPGs), the logs of user
interactions may be available for the observer through chat channels (c.f.Boella et al. 2008).
3 Assume that event occurrences can be modelled as simple propositions.
4 A subsequence is a sequence that can be generated from a sequence by removing certain
elements from the sequence without altering the order of the elements in the sequence. For example,
"anna" is a subsequence of "banana". Conversely, one of the supersequences of "anna" is "banana".
5 A sub-episode is a subsequence of an event episode.
6 A previous work (Savarimuthu et al. 2010) has shown how the former can be identiﬁed.
7 We note that the cost of punishment is not modelled in this work because our main focus is to
model and experiment with how an agent is able to recognize a norm in the ﬁrst place. The cost of
punishment has been experimented with in other works (Savarimuthu et al. 2008; Savarimuthu et al.
2010).
8 We note this decision is domain speciﬁc. In some other domains such as an auction, it could bethat an agent is prohibited from buying three consecutive items of the same type. In those cases
each action of the same type should be recorded. We note that the mechanism proposed in this
paper can handle this scenario.
9 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lgBZBUbu-qg
10 http://www.openabm.org/model-archive/norm_identiﬁcation
11 An agent may initially set the visibility threshold to a lower value so that it does not have to
process a large amount of information. If it does not ﬁnd a norm, it can then choose to observe
interactions that happen in a larger area by increasing its visibility.
12 When the number of referees increases, the rate of norm establishment increases. This has also
been reported in many other works in multi-agent systems (Yu and Singh 2002;Yolum and Singh
2003;Candale and Sen 2005).
13 A norm inference instance is related to NIF. An agent infers a norm once every x iterations as
governed by NIF. When an agent invokes its norm inference component this is known as a norm
inference instance.
14 For example, when WS=1, if p precedes a sanction, then p-t may be identiﬁed as the protocol. In
the ONI algorithm, the size of the super-sequence of a subsequence of size n is n+1.
15 When WS is set to 5, the length of the sub-sequences can vary from one to ﬁve.
16 PT is p-t.
17 There can be several reasons why punishers may stop punishing. The punishers can move from
one society to another or can just stop punishing because their utility has gone below a certain
threshold.
18 The simulation video can be found at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sZhsﬂiW83g.
19 In fact, paying after eating is related to a protocol than a norm. For arguments sake, let us
consider this to be a norm.
20 We note that norm conﬂict resolution is being studied by some researchers (e.g.Kollingbaum et al.
2007,Vasconcelos et al. 2009).
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